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Notes
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -
THE "GOING AND COMING" RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
IN KENTUCKY
The phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment" in
the Workmen's Compensation Act' has been the cause of much liti-
gation. In Kentucky it is well established that the phrase has two
independent components which must each be satisfied.
The words, "in the course of' employment have reference to the
time, place, and circumstances [activity], while the words "arising out
of" the employment relate to the cause or source of the accident. The
terms "out of" and "in the course of" are not synonymous, and if
either of these two elements is missing, there can be no recovery.2
This note will be directed toward a discussion of only the
"in the course of" element of the phrase, and more narrowly to a
discussion of the various exceptions to the "going and coming" rule.
The general rule is that "in the absence of special circumstances an
employee injured in going to or coming from his place of work is
excluded from the benefits of workmen's compensation."3 The theory
for excluding employees form the benefits of workmen's compensation
while "going to or coming from work" is that they are not perform-
ing any service for their employer and are exposed to risk, not as
employees, but rather as members of the general public.4
The "Premises" Exception
Since employees generally are not within the protection of work-
men's compensation laws while going to or coming from work the
question arises, at what point should the employee be considered
"in the course of' his employment? As Larson explains, the course
of employment is not confined to the actual manipulation of the tools
of the work, but neither was the Workmen's Compensation Act in-
tended to protect the worker against all the perils of the journey.
Consequently, the first exception to the "going and coming" rule
was developed as a compromise between these two extremes. 5 By the
'Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.005 (1959).
2 Phil Hollenbach Co. v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 280-81, 204 S.W. 152,
159-60 (1918), the first case in Kentucky interpreting the phrase "arising out of
and in the course of."
3 8 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation § 1710 (3rd or perm. ed. 1951).
4 Draper v. Railway Accessories Co., 300 Ky. 597, 601, 189 S.W. 2d 934,
937 (1945).
5 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 15.11 (1952).
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weight of authority injuries sustained by an employee while going
to or from his place of work upon premises owned or controlled by
his employer are generally deemed to have occurred in the course
of employment.6
At first blush this exception may appear easy to apply, but this
is not the case for its application has proved a troublesome problem
in Kentucky. The court in its early decisions applied the exception
without modification. 7 For example, in Barres v. Watterson a hotel
maid was injured on her employer's premises while on her way home
from work. In response to a suit based on negligence, the employer
contended that the maid was covered by workmen's compensation.
In upholding this contentioh the court said:
As it was necessary for appellant to enter or leave the premises of the
hotel company in the performance of her duties, and her duties did
not cease until she was off the premises of her employer, it is clear
that she was at the time of her injury in the course of her employ-
ment within the meaning of the act.9
Again the court applied the basic "premises" exception in Wilson
Berger Coal Co. v. Brown1 ° in which a coal miner was injured on the
premises when he stumbled over a rock on the path while on his way
from the tipple where he worked to a company-owned house where
he lived. In approving an award of compensation the court stated:
There can be no doubt that an employee, while going to, or return-
ing from, his place of work along a road leading over his employer's
premises, and built and intended for his use, is still in the course of
his employment, and if he is injured while so traveling, the acci-
dent is one arising out of and in the course of his employment. 1 1
These two cases illustrate the problem that can arise and which has
in fact been the source of conflicting decisions in Kentucky. While
it may be reasonable to extend the course of employment to the
property line of the employer where the premises consist of a build-
ing, the same may not be true where the premises consist of a large
6 8 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation § 1712 (3rd penn. ed. 1951);
Annot., 82 A.L.R. 1043, 1044 (1933).
7 Black Mountain Corporation v. Vaughn, 280 Ky. 271, 132 S.W. 2d 938
(1939) (compensable where coal miner killed while riding on train of loaded cars
from barn to head house); A. C. Lawrence Leather Co. v. Barnhill, 249 Ky. 437,
61 S.W. 2d 1 (1933) (compensable where employee injured while at or near
parking lot on premises); Harlan Gas Coal Co. v. Trial, 213 Ky. 226, 280 S.W.
954 (1926) (compensable where coal miner killed while walking from bath house
to place of work on premises); Big Elkhom Coal Co. v. Burke, 206 Ky. 489, 267
S.W. 142 (1924) (compensable where coal miner killed while on way from
room in mine to outside).
8 196 Ky. 100, 244 S.W. 808 (1922).
9 Id. at 103, 244 S.W. at 310.
10223 Ky. 183, 3 S.W. 2d 199 (1928).
11 Id. at 184, 3 S.W. 2d. at 200.
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area of land.12 If the premises consist of a large area of land such
as is generally true with respect to coal mines, should the employee
be deemed to be "in the course of" his employment when he is within
the property line of his employer? Larson states that "some juris-
dictions have followed out the 'premises' rule [exception] literally
even if it meant taking in an entire island."13
In order to avoid such a literal application of the "premises" excep-
tion, where the premises consisted of a large area of land, the court
limited the excepti6n in Harlan Collieries Co. v. Shell.14 This case
concerned a coal miner on his way home who was injured in a truck
accident while still on the premises of the employer. In reversing an
award of compensation the court re-examined the purpose of work-
men's compensation laws and concluded that they are basically
"designed to indemnify the employee from financial loss resulting
from exposure to industrial hazards."15 This decision tends to indi-
cate that the court, in those cases involving a large area of property,
will not apply the basic "premises" exception. Instead, the court
insists that the injury must have a relation to an industrial hazard.
However, this method of narrowing the premises may not prove
effective. One noted writer has said that even though the choice
of the employer's property line can be criticized as an arbitrary line,
nevertheless it is definite. "But if some other point between entering
the premises and picking up the broom is to be the starting point,
it is difficult to imagine how that point can successfully be defined."10
Since the Kentucky Court has abandoned the property line as the
place where the employee will be deemed to begin and end the
course of his employment,' 7 a new line must be drawn as a substi-
tute. The opportunity to do this presented itself in Clear Fork Coal
12 Draper v. Railway Accessories Co., 300 Ky. 597, 189 S.W. 2d 934 (1945)
(dictum to the effect that, even if "premises" exception is applicable, compensa-
tion will be defeated where the employee does not use the normal route of ingress
and egress); 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 5, § 15.43.
1' 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 5, § 15.43.
14289 S.W. 2d 923 (Ky. 1951). Accord, Barker v. Eblen Coal Co., 276 S.W.
2d 248 (Ky. 1955) (not compensable where coal miner injured in automobile
accident while driving from company house to the mine); United States Steel
Co. v. Isbell, 275 S.W. 2d 917 (Ky. 1955) (injury not compensable where coal
miner was injured walking down path from parking lot toward bath house); Harlan-
Walling Coal Corp. v. Stewart, 275 S.W. 2d 912 (Ky. 1955) (not compensable
where coal miner after completing work left his lamp at lamp house and was
thereafter injured while walking toward home along highway on employer's
premises).
15 Harlan Collieries Co. v. Shell, 239 S.W. 2d 923, 926 (Ky. 1951).
16 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 5, at 211.
l7 King v. Lexington Herald, 313 S.W. 2d 423 (Ky. 1958) (where the prem-
ises consist of a building, the court still applies the basic "premises" exception);
accord, Barres v. Watterson, 196 Ky. 100, 244 S.W. 308 (1922) (hotel maid in-jured while leaving building).
Co. v. Roberts18 in which the court approved an award of compensa-
tion to a coal miner who was injured in a truck wreck which oc-
curred after the employee changed clothes at the bath house and
accepted a ride to his work place at the tipple located three-quarters
of a mile away. The court reasoned that he was engaged in a work-
connected activity when proceeding from the bath house to the
tipple. Thus, the court in effect estabilshed that the new line would
be one drawn around a work-connected activity as opposed to draw-
ing a geographical line.
In groping for a formula as a substitute for the "premises" ex-
ception the court had decided earlier in the same year, Barker v.
Eblen Coal Co.,19 which is difficult to reconcile with the Roberts
case. In the Barker case the court upheld denial of an award of
compensation to a coal miner who was injured while on his way to
work from a company house located on the premises to the mine
operation. He had accepted a ride in a fellow employee's automobile
to the top of a hill where the mine operation was located and after
reaching the top, the car backed over the hill due to defective brakes.
By comparison, the facts of the two cases are identical except that
in the Roberts case the employee stopped at the bath house to change
clothes before proceeding to his work place, while in the Barker case
the employee rode straight from his home to the actual place of work.
Assuming that each accident occurred at the same place, should
the mere fact that one employee chose to change into work clothes
at home before proceeding to the mine deprive him of the benefits
of workmen's compensation. One possible explaination of these cases
is that the Barker case was following the test laid down in the Shell
case,20 that the injury must have resulted from exposure to an indus-
trial hazard, while the test applied in the Roberts case was that the
injury must occur after the commencement of a work-connected
activity. If the phrase "work-connected activity" is synonymous with
"work-connected place" it seems that the employee in the Barker case
was in the course of employment, since his accident occurred at the
place of the mine operation.
Kentucky has not been alone in groping for a solution to the
problem as to when an employee should be considered in the course
of his employment. Because of the extensive coal mining in Penn-
sylvania, the courts there have been faced with the identical problem.
182 79 S.W. 2d 797 (Ky. 1955). Accord, Harlan-Wallins Coal Corp. v. Foster,
277 S.W. 2d 14 (Ky. 1955) (compensable where coal miner suffered an injury
when he fell on icy road while en route from his work place to the mine office
to return a lamp he had used on his shift).
19276 S.W. 2d 448 (Ky. 1955).2 0 Supra note 14.
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They have attempted a solution to the problem by giving the word
"premises" a different meaning. For example, they have said ac-
cording to Schneider, "There is a distinction between 'premises' of
the employer and 'property' of the employer, and they are not always
synonymous. The term 'premises' has a narrower meaning than the
term 'property' when used in compensation cases."2' Thus, where an
employee was injured on a parking lot located upon the property of
the employer a denial of compensation was approved since the park-
ing lot was not a part of the operating premises so as to form an
integral part thereof.22
Also, West Virginia, where coal mining is also a major industry,
has been confronted with the problem. Her courts have defined the
zone of employment not on the basis of the premises but rather as
a point reasonably proximate to the place of work. Or in other words,
the zone of employment must have some proximate relation to the
plant equipment of the employer, as distinguished from premises
of the employer.23
Admitting that these tests are vague when compared with the
definitness of the property line test under the "premises" exception,
they seem to provide a reasonable solution to the problem. Possibly
the last test laid down in Kentucky in the Roberts case, "work-con-
nected activity" is the same test stated in different language. Further-
more, it is believed that "work-connected activity" here means the
same thing as "work-connected place."24 If so, by drawing the new
line around a "work-connected place," consistent results should be
able to be reached which will prove fair to both the employer and
the employee within the spirit of the Workmen's Compensation
Statute.
Extension of the Premises
The courts hold with practical unanimity that, if the injury occurs
after the employee has left the premises of his employer and gotten
upon a public highway, any injury which he might receive as a result
of accidents that are common to the general traveling public is not
21 8 Schneider, op. cit. supra note 3, at 50.22 Young v. Hamilton Watch Co., 158 Pa. Super 448, 45 A. 2d 261 (1946).
23 Carper v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, 121 W. Va. 1, 1 S.E.
2d 165 (1939).2 4 This seems especially true when the phrase "work-connected activity"
is used to determine whether the injury arose "in the course of" the employment.
In contrast, "work-connected activity" when used to determine whether the
injury "arose out of" the employment might well be expressive of the same idea
as that expressed by the phrase "exposure to industrial hazard" used in the Shell
case, supra note 14, where the court seems to be talking about causation, that is,
about the question whether the injury "arose out of" the employment. In the
Roberts case, supra note 17, the court uses the phrase "work-connected activity"
where it is discussing the question whether the injury arose "in the course of" the
employment.
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received in the course of employment. 25 However, various attempts
have been made to broaden the premises, especially where the in-
jury occurs just outside the boundary.26 Larson suggests that the
test should be to extend the premises to include areas where there are
special hazards on the normal route which the employee must travel
in going to and coming from work.27
A good illustration of extending the premises to encompass a
highway in front of the premises is Louisville and Jefferson County
Air Board v. Riddle28 in which the night custodian at an airfield
alighted from a bus on the south side of the highway in front of the
airfield on his way to work. He checked the obstacle lights located
just outside the premises and then as he crossed the highway going
toward the airfield gate, he was hit by a car. His injuries were held
compensable on the ground that as a practical matter the employer's
premises extended to include the obstacle lights maintained across
the highway. Even though the court gave as the reason for its deci-
sion the fact that the employee was engaged in his work when check-
ing the obstacle lights, the case could have been decided under
Larson's view that:
[Wihen a court has satisfied itself that there is a distinct "arising
out of' or causal connection between the conditions under which
claimant must approach and leave the premises and the occurrence
of the injury, it may hold that the course of employment extends as
far as those conditions extend. 29
Special Errand
In addition to the "premises" exception to the "going and coming"
rule, another exception is made when the employee is sent on a
"special errand" outside the premises.30 The explanation for this
exception is that the journey itself is part of the service.31 Applica-
tions of the "special errand" exception have been made where an
employee is injured while returning to the store at night to admit
an electrician or a janitor is injured while returning to the school at
night to turn on the lights for a basketball game.32 The Court of
Appeals of Kentucky has recognized and applied this exception where
25 Miracle v. Harlan-Wallins Coal Corp., 311 Ky. 169, 223 S.W. 2d 738
(1949); Porter v. Stoll Oil Refining Co., 242 Ky. 392, 46 S.W. 2d 510 (1932);
8 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation § 1711(a) (1951).
26 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 15.12 (1952). See Draper v. Railway
Accessories Co., 300 Ky. 597, 189 S.W. 2d 934 (1945), where it seems a good
argument could have been made on the theory that there were special hazards
along the only route which the employee knew about.
27\1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 5, § 15.13.
28 301 Ky. 100, 190 S.W. 2d 1009 (1945).
2 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 5, at 201.
30 8 Schneider, op. cit. supra note 8, § 1732.
31 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 5, at 223.
32 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 5, at 224.
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a janitor was injured while on an errand into the city to ascertain
why a certain employee had not reported for duty;3 3 where a
mechanic was injured when sent to the home of the president of the
corporation for which he worked to make minor repairs;34 and where
an employee was injured enroute home after purchasing supplies
for the ensuing week to take to the saw mill on Monday morning.35
Transportation Furnished by Employer
Another exception engrafted on the rule that injuries suffered off
the premises in going to and from work are not in the course of
employment is where the injury is sustained while the employee is
being transported by his employer to and from the place of em-
ployment pursuant to a contractual obligation.36 "The provision of
transportation by the employer may come about as a result of cus-
tom and usage as well as by express contract, as in the cases where
employees, working at some distance from their homes, engage in
the known and habitual practice of riding on the employer's trucks."T
However, one noted authority disagrees with the "contract" test on
the theory that the true reason for the exception is that the employer
has control of the risks while transporting the employee. Thus, he
says:
[T]he distinction between transportation provided by contract and
transportation provided without agreement or as a courtesy is being
increasingly questioned, since the fundamental reason for extension
of liability-the extension of the actual employer-controlled risks of
employment-is not affected by the question whether the transporta-
tion was furnished because of obligation or out of courtesy.38
So under this view, if a trip to or from work is made in a vehicle
under the control of the employer, an injury during that trip is in-
curred in the course of employment.3 9
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky seems to approve the "con-
tract" test as indicated in State Highway Commission v. Saylor4° which
involved an employer who transported his employees to and from
their work of mowing briers along the highway. From the practice
and custom of transporting the workers, the court implied a contract
to transport them. The employee was struck by a car after he had
been deposited on the highway in front of his residence. Even though
the court implied a contract, thus extending the course of employ-
3 3 Palmer v. Main, 209 Ky. 226, 272 S.W. 736 (1925).3 1 Nugent Sand Co. v. Hargesheimer, 254 Ky. 358, 71 S.W. 2d 647 (1934).
35 Hall v. Spurlock, 310 S.W. 2d 259 (Ky. 1957).36 8 Schneider, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1741.
37 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 5, at 236.
38 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 5, at 236-37.
:39 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 5, § 17.10.
40252 Ky. 743, 68 S.W. 2d 26 (1933).
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ment to the time while he was being transported, it reversed an
award of compensation holding that the contractual relation had
ended when the employee was deposited safely on the highway.
Larson says that even though the general rule is well recognized
there is a sharp division of authority whether the protection of the
employer's conveyance extends after the employee has been de-
posited.41 While the court does recognize the exception, it has dis-
approved awards of compensation where a laborer was injured
while riding to work with an employee who had been engaged with
his truck for work on a road construction job;42 where an employee
of a road building contractor was injured by falling off a truck
which he contended the employer directed him to ride;43 and where
a laborer was injured while on his way to work while riding on the
running board of his foreman's car.44
Cost of Transportation Paid by Employer
Another exception to the "going and coming" rule is made when
the cost of transportation is paid by the employer.45 Larson disagrees
with the statement of the exception, because it can produce different
results depending on the labeling of the payment. However, he
agrees with the result, reasoning that employment should be deemed
to include travel when the travel itself is a substantial part of the
service performed. 46 The Kentucky Court recognized this exception
in Turner Day and Woolworth Handle Co. v. Pennington47 in which,
as inducement to the employee to go to distant locations to work,
the employer agreed to allow him to return home on week-ends at
the expense of the employer. While returning home on Saturday
night the employee sustained injuries in an automobile accident
for which he was awarded compensation. However, a more recent
case indicates that payment of travel expenses by the employer may
not be sufficient in itself. An award of compensation was disapproved
where the employee who was the son of the president of the cor-
poration was permitted to use a company car with oil and gas paid
for by the corporation in order to make a trip in an effort to secure
a different job. The court felt that the trip bore no relationship to
any service he was at the time undertaking in behalf of his employer.
48
This latter case seems to support Larson's view that the travel itself
41 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 5, § 17.40.42 W. T. Congleton Co. v. Bradley, 259 Ky. 127, 81 S.W. 2d 912 (1935).43 Gray v. W. T. Congleton Co., 263 Ky. 716, 93 S.W. 2d 829 (1936).44 Billiter, Miller and McClure v. Hickman, 247 Ky. 211, 56 S.W. 2d 1003
(1933)
45 8 Schneider, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1744.
46 1 Larson, op cit. supra note 5, § 16.80.
47250 Ky. 433, 63 S.W. 2d 490 (1933).
48 Taylor v. Taylor Tire Co., 285 S.W. 2d 173 (Ky. 1955).
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must be a substantial part of the service performed to be considered
in course of the employment. 49
Where Traveling Itself is Part of the Job
Still another exception to the "going and coming" rule is where
traveling itself is part of the job, in which case the employee will
be considered in the course of employment from the time he leaves
home, until his return home.50 The underlying theory for the excep-
tion is that the journey itself is part of the service for the employer.51
Among the cases decided by the Kentucky Court, Standard Oil Com-
pany v. Witt52 best illustrates the application of this exception. In
that case the employee was a construction foreman who was required
to travel from his home to work on construction projects. Whenever
he did not return home on week-ends, his board and lodging were
paid for by his employer. While a guest in a hotel on such a weekend
the employee was killed in a fire about 4:30 on a Monday morning.
The court approved an award of compensation on the basis that when
he met his death he was at a place where he was expected and re-
quired to be by the nature of his employment.
Where an employee is required to travel as part of his job a prob-
lem often arises when the employee deviates from his regular route.
Among the various situations in which the problem may arise is where
an employee takes a personal side-trip while en route, which side-
trip will take him out of the course of employment. 53 However, where
the side-trip has been completed and the direct route has been re-
sumed the employee is again in the course of employment.5 4 Between
these two situations the question arises whether the employee is in
the course of employment when he resumes his journey but has not
yet reached his regular route? The Kentucky Court was confronted
with this problem in Inland Gas Corporation v. Frazier55 which in-
49 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 5, § 16.30.
50 8 Schneider, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1737.
51 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 5, § 16.00.
52 283 Ky. 327, 141 S.W. 2d 271 (1940). Compare Hinde v. Allen-Codell
Co., 298 Ky. 102, 182 S.W. 2d 20 (194 (compensable where employee was
injured while traveling to his place of work on Sunday in order to he ready to
begin working on Monday morning), with Scott Tobacco Co. v. Cooper, 258 Ky.
795, 81 S.W. 2d 588 (1934) (not compensable where traveling salesman injured
on Sunday at the place he went to be ready to work the ensuing week).
53 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 5, § 19.31.
54 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 5, § 19.32.
55 246 Ky. 432, 55 S.W. 2d 26 (1932). See also Colwell v. Mosley, 309 S.W.
350 (Ky. 1958) (not compensable where truck driver was injured when he stopped
on his route in order to pull his brother-in-law's car); Mason-Waller Motor Co.
v. Holeman, 284 Ky. 374, 144 S.W. 2d 796 (1940) (compensable where auto-
mobile salesman visited prospects in several towns and while doing so, picked
up friends with whom he visited various dancehalls; te court concluding that
he had resumed his employment).
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volved an employee who was required to report from his job at one
location to another place. In making the trip the employee deviated
from his regular route by taking a side-trip to spend the night with
his family. Early the next morning he resumed his trip toward the
new location and when at a point only three miles from his regular
route, he was killed in an automobile collision. In denying an award
of compensation the court conceded that the nature of his work and
terms of his contract required him to travel, but found that at the
time and place of his death he was engaged in his own pleasure
while returning to the usual route of travel. Thus, the court fol-
lowed the majority view. However, a minority take the view that
an injury occurring during the journey toward the normal route
should be compensable because the employee's only purpose is get-
ting to his employment destination.56
RxcmE D. CooPER
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -
ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
In order for an injury to an employee to be compensable under
the Workmen's Compensation Statute, the employee must prove
among other things that the injury "arose out of and in the course
of employment." As was pointed out in a previous note,1 this latter
phrase was defined by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in the first
workmen's compensation case to come before the court when it said:
The words, "in the course of' employment have reference to the
time, place and circumstances [activity], while the words "arising
out of' the employment relate to the cause or source of the accident.
"The term 'out of' and 'in the course of are not synonymous, and if
either of these elements is missing, there can be no recovery. The
two questions are to be determined by different tests. The words
'out of' refer to the origin or cause of the accident and the words
'in the course of' to the time, place and circumstances [activity]
under which it occurred." z
In other words, "whenever your controversy stems from the nature
of a source of injury to the claimant, you have primarily a question
of 'arising out of the employment'." 3 Thus, it becomes important
to know whether the injury was the result of the manipulation of
the tools of his work, or from the personal animosity of a fellow
employee, or from something else such as a stray bullet or bolt of
56 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 5, § 19.33.
1 Note, 47 Kentucky Law Journal 420 (1959) supra.
2 Phil Hollenbach Co. v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 280-81, 204 S.W. 2d 152,
159-60 (1918).
3 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 23.61 (1952).
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